The Nazis were wrong! (Part II)

Back at Well That Was Daft Nasher has a response to my take on the nature of morality. In his original post he took the position that morality was subjective stating that even the rightness or wrongness of the Holocaust is just a matter of opinion. I took a different approach explaining while I don't think moral truths are determined the same way as scientific truths, they are not on the same level as matters of taste and are actually epistemologically objective. Now Nasher has a follow up where he clarifies his position.

Nasher agrees that my example "apricots taste better than strawberries" is an example of a subjective truth. Something that is true for me but not necessarily true for anyone else. However, he goes further saying "sugar tastes better than elephant dung" is also an example of a subjective truth. I would disagree, if there was someone who maintained they found elephant dung more tasty than sugar I would assume they either haven't tasted each one or they are confused about which is which. If someone told me "sugar tastes better than elephant dung" my response would be 'well, of course' and not 'that's just your opinion'.

Nasher seems to partially agree with me but also wants to broaden the area of concern to other species, even hypothetical ones. I am suspicious of the value of this move. Perhaps dung beetle larva do find elephant dung more tasty than sugar (although, do they even taste?) but what if I change the original statement to "sugar tastes better than elephant dung to humans"? Does this make the question suddenly objective rather than subjective? I think Nasher would still insist this statement is subjective even though other species are now excluded. A further issue I have is that I don't really think dung beetle larva have anything to add to discussions on morality. As far as we know, humans are the only species capable of engaging in advanced moral reasoning. Perhaps this will change in the future but it seems fairly pointless to speculate.

Nasher then brings it back to a realistic example saying that people raised in different environments can be more or less prone to bigotry and homophobia without considering themselves immoral. But my response to these people is to explain why they are wrong. Often it is a case of correcting facts like demonstrating the folk concept of race does not match up to the modern biological understanding of the human species or showing studies refuting the idea that homosexuals are bad parents. To dig a little further into the homophobia example, these people already agree with the basic moral principle that raising children in a stable household with loving parents is a good thing. Often the objections revolve around concerns that homosexual parents can't provide the same nurturing environment as heterosexual parents. If the homophobes still insist on their point of view after being shown studies on child performance outcomes that dispute their claim, then they are like the flat-earther, simply denying reality. Importantly what I am not saying is that everyone will agree with every moral judgement. There is scope for reasonable disagreement, especially around the fringes where new arguments appear frequently. A good example of this is animal rights. Perhaps in the future we will look back and see eating animals as immoral similar to the way we look back and realise how wrong scientists were to believe in the ether theory of light. Our morality, like our science, can update itself - but this doesn't make either source of knowledge any less objective.

To be honest I don't fully understand Nasher's last paragraph. He says we must have a "clear, immovable frame of reference to which we can compare and contrast the viewpoint". There is a broad inter-cultural agreement about what constitutes a good person and what sort of activities are prohibited. Surely we can compare the results of our moral reasoning to that? This doesn't rule out the possibility of being wrong about a moral judgement nor updating as new information comes in. But it does give us a frame of reference from which to start our (objective) moral reasoning.

The Nazis were wrong!

Over at Well that was Daft Nasher lays out his position on objective and subjective truths. I have a different take on this subject to him and one critique of his post that may make him rethink things a little.

First, let’s get clear on the distinction between objective and subjective. Following John Searle I’ll distinguish between two types of questions: metaphysical and epistemological. Metaphysical questions concern “what exists?” Something exists objectively if its existence doesn’t depend on it being experienced. For example, the Earth exists whether or not there is someone here to experience it. On the other hand, subjective existence depends on being experienced. The feeling of a stubbed toe or the aroma of a nice Sauvignon Blanc are metaphysically subjective and their existence depends on me experiencing them. The experience is unique to me, you could never find out the way stubbing my toe felt to me.

However, Nasher is more concerned with epistemological questions. These are questions regarding “what is true?” Epistemologically objective statements can be true or false but the methods used to determine their truth value have to be publicly available and generally agreed upon. By ‘publicly available’ I mean not reliant on personal subjective experience and ‘generally agreed upon’ means that reasonable people, when presented with the same evidence, would come to the same conclusion. To take Nasher’s example:

“Some things are absolutely, objectively true. That the Earth is round is an example of this kind of truth.”

This is indeed an objective statement. We can take a publicly available observation – departing ships sink below the horizon – and draw the reasonable conclusion that the Earth is round. Epistemologically subjective statements are those whose truth value is determined by metaphysically subjective evidence. If I was to say “apricots taste better than strawberries” the primary evidence in determining the truth of that statement would be how different fruits taste to me. Someone else who has different subjective experiences of taste could reasonably disagree with my statement.
Nasher proposes a novel test do determine whether a truth statement is objective or subjective:

“Did the Nazis themselves think they were justified [in the systematic extermination of six million Jews]? If the answer is "yes", if even a single Nazi considered the holocaust justified, then the answer to this moral question is subjective. In fact, all it takes is the capacity for someone to consider it justified and it becomes subjective.”

But is this test sufficient? What if we change the topic and consider a flat-Earther? Surely there is a single flat-Earther who considers their position on the shape of the Earth to be justified, or - if not - we can at least agree there is the capacity for someone to consider the flat Earth position justified. According to Nasher’s test this makes the issue of the planet’s shape subjective, but earlier we agreed that this was an objective question. I would submit to Nasher that his central test for subjectivity leads to outcomes that he would reject.

We could modify the subjectivity test slightly to avoid my objection. If we said that no reasonable person could find flat-Earth justified then we have a second criteria that would eliminate the problem. But now we have to apply the new criteria to the moral question, could a reasonable person find the Nazi holocaust justifiable? Nasher seems to think not:

“Obviously, your answer is "no". I share your sentiments. I consider the Holocaust to be one of the worst crimes committed in human history. If you do not feel the same way, I invite you to jump off a skyscraper and rid the rest of the world of your barbaric views.”

I agree. Someone who thinks the holocaust was justified, even if they are Nazi, is either lacking certain information or is just not thinking in a reasonable way - a "barbarian".

Since morality is based on certain objective facts about the world and a need for clear and rational thinking, it seems morality is much closer to the realm of epistemological objectivism than subjectivism. Hence why am a moral objectivist and can confidently say that the Nazis were wrong!